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NOTES 
Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and 
Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties 
Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from 
Lawyers 
The various methods by which the states currently select their 
judges fall into five general categories: executive appointment, legisla-
tive selection, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and "merit" se-
lection, which involves selection by a committee professing special 
competence to select judges. 1 Within these five categories, states differ 
as to many particulars, such as the term of office and the method of 
renomination, so that no two systems are exactly alike.2 However, 
forty-three states currently use methods requiring at least some judges 
to stand for election in order to win or retain office. 3 The nature of the 
elections varies from state to state;4 but no matter which selection 
method a state employs, the judges in all forty-three of these states 
must at some point raise campaign funds. 5 
The obvious place for judges to seek those campaign funds is the 
local bar, 6 since attorneys are likely to be more familiar than the gen-
I. The broad outlines of each type of system are discussed in Judicial Selection: What Fits 
Texas? A National Symposium on Judicial Selection and Tenure, 40 Sw. L.J. I, 1-52 (1986). 
2. The details of the various state selection processes are set forth in L. BERKSON, S. BELLER 
& M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVI· 
SIONS 1-46 (1980). 
3. The exceptions are Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Virginia. Id. Thirty-nine of those states elect the judges on the highest appellate 
court in the state, with Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and New York being the additional 
exceptions. Id. 
The degree of conformity among American jurisdictions on this point is truly astounding. 
Outside of the United States the only places in the world where judges are elected arc the Soviet 
Union, its satellites, and to a limited extent Switzerland. Kauffman, Judicial Selection ill Pe1111· 
sylva11ia: A Proposal, 21 VILL. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.6 (1982). 
4. Elections are generally partisan or nonpartisan races in which multiple candidates may vie 
for judicial office, or "retention" elections in which the incumbent judge is unopposed and the 
issue is simply whether he should remain in office. L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, 
supra note 2, at 1-46. 
5. Moreover, the need for fundraising has increased markedly in the last decade. Dubois, 
Financing Trial Court Elections: Who Contributes to California Judicial Campaigns?, 70 JUDICA-
TURE 8, 9 (1986). The author attributes the increased cost of judicial election campaigns to 
increases in both the number of candidates for judicial office and the amount spent by each. 
6. Indeed, lawyers constitute the largest single group of contributors to judicial campaigns. 
DuBois, supra note 5, found that in the contested 1980 California Superior Court elections, law-
yers and Jaw firms donated 39.2% of the money spent in the primaries and 32.4% of the money 
spent in runoff elections. Id. at 12. In Circuit Court general elections in Cook County, Illinois, 
other researchers found that more than half of all outside contributions came from lawyers and 
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eral public with the candidates and the demands of the office. 7 How-
ever, reliance on attorney contributions raises a disturbing question 
about the even-handedness of justice when one of a judge's major con-
tributors8 later argues a case before that judge: Is the contributor's 
opponent being deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impar-
tial forum? 
Traditionally, the states and the legal profession have viewed the 
problem of attorney contributions as one of professional ethics.9 The 
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct10 (CJC) defines 
the ethical bounds of judicial campaign conduct in Canon 7(B), 11 
law firms. Nicholson & Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
70 JUDICATURE 17, 21-22 (1986). 
7. See c. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.3.2, at 601 (1986). 
8. There is no obvious reason why pecuniary support should be more likely to influence a 
judge than some forms of nonpecuniary support, such as serving as a campaign manager or party 
leader. This Note is therefore concerned with all aspects of political support during judicial 
campaigns, and terms like "political contributors" will be used throughout the Note to include 
all political supporters, unless otherwise noted. 
Somewhat more troubling is the case of conspicuous noncontributors. It would be absurd to 
argue for a due process right to have one's case heard only by a judge to whom one has contrib-
uted time or money. However, there may be cases where noncontributors' due process rights are 
jeopardized, such as where a perennial supporter withdraws support and refuses to contribute 
after overt solicitation, or where an attorney has been intimately involved in the opposition's 
campaign. This latter category would obviously include those cases where one of the attorneys 
was the losing candidate, especially in hotly contested races. While such cases may arise infre-
quently, the due process analysis set out in Part II of this Note should also apply when conspicu-
ous noncontribution endangers a litigant's right to a fair and impartial forum. 
Although this Note deals with all aspects of political support, it is concerned only with polit-
ical support and does not rely on any assumptions about corruption in the state judiciary. On the 
contrary, actual bribery is completely irrelevant to this Note, since each state already prohibits 
that sort of misconduct. This Note deals only with the constitutional ramifications of campaign 
conduct which is perfectly legal and for which an adversely affected litigant currently has no 
other recourse. 
9. Self-regulation is the primary form of' regulation of the legal profession. See C. WOLF-
RAM, supra note 7, § 2.1, at 20-22. 
10. Currently, the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct has been enacted in 
substantial part in forty-seven jurisdictions, including the federal system and the District of Co-
lumbia. Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have each adopted separate 
standards of judicial conduct. Goldstein, Fundraising by Judges: Ethical Restrictions on Assist-
ing Civic, Charitable and Other Organizations, 70 JUDICATURE 27, 27 n.l (1986). 
11. Canon 7(B) states: 
B. Campaign Conduct. 
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled either by 
public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit system election: 
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and should encourage 
members of his family to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply to 
him· 
Cb) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direction or control from 
doing for him what he is prohibited from doing under this Canon; and except to the extent 
authorized under subsection B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for 
him what he is prohibited from doing under this Canon; 
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or 
political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact. 
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public 
election between competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, 
384 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:382 
which takes the general approach of attempting to prevent candidates 
from learning the identities of their contributors.12 The CJC also sug-
gests that "[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," including instances 
where "he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," or 
where he knows that he or a close relative is financially interested in 
the litigation or a party to it. 13 Moreover, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code of Professional Responsibility14 and Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct15 prohibit lawyers from making gifts or loans 
to judges unless allowable under the CJC.16 
However, state attempts to police judicial campaigns through rules 
of professional ethics have been unsuccessful. 17 One problem is that 
enforcement of the CJC has been hampered by the fact that the judi-
cial conduct commissions vested with the authority to enforce the ethi-
cal provisions against judges often have no authority over losing 
candidates. 18 However, a more fundamental problem is that the gen-
or solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to 
secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public state-
ments of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting 
campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may 
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a primary election and no 
later than [90] days after the last election in which he participates during the election year. 
A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private 
benefit of himself or members of his family. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972) (emphasis added) (the bracketed portions arc 
to be modified as appropriate in each state). 
12. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972), quoted in note 11 supra. The 
inadequacy of anonymity as a general approach to questions of improper influence is discussed 
briefly in the text accompanying notes 19-21 infra. 
13. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(l) (1972) (emphasis added). 
14. The ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969. Since 
then nearly every jurisdiction has adopted the Code in some way, and in most states the Code has 
the force of law and is thus binding on all lawyers rather than ABA members only. C. WOLF-
RAM, supra note 7, § 2.6.3, at 56-57. 
15. The ABA promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983 to respond to 
criticism of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. § 2.6.4, at 60. Though still young, the 
Model Rules do not promise to have nearly the influence that the earlier Code did. Id. § 2.6.4, at 
62-63. 
16. Disciplinary Rule 7-1 lO(A) provides: 
A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official, or employee of a 
tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
but a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office 
in conformity with Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-llO(A) (1980). See also MODE!. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(f) (1983) (prohibiting lawyers from "knowingly 
assist[ing] a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial 
conduct or other law"). 
17. For a thorough examination of this problem, canvassing state adoption, modification, 
and enforcement of Canon 7(B), see generally Survey, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaig11i11g for 
Judicial Office: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1986) [hereinafter Ethical 
Dilemma]. 
18. See Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Em-
peror's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 91-93 (1985); Ethical Dilemma, supra 
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eral approach taken by the CJC - forced contributor anonymity ac-
companied by discretionary disqualification is hopelessly 
inadequate. The commentary to CJC Canon 7(B) states that "[u]nless 
the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contribu-
tors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate."19 How-
ever, only ten states included this commentary in their enactments of 
the CJC, and all fifty states currently require disclosure of all contribu-
tions and the names of those who contribute more than a minimum 
amount.2° Contributor anonymity is thus nearly impossible to en-
force. Furthermore, even with perfect enforcement of the CJC's pol-
icy of contributor anonymity, judges will still know the identities of 
many of their supporters merely by looking around at fundraisers and 
other functions which are legitimate under the Canons.21 
This failure of the states to police judicial elections adequately is 
no mere problem of judicial ethics. It also raises constitutional con-
cerns to the extent that past campaign contributions by one of the 
attorneys22 in a case may deprive the opposing party of his right, 
note 17, at 384. This is so in spite of the fact that Canon 7(B) applies by its own terms to 
"candidates," rather than merely judges, and in spite of the fact that Disciplinary Rule 8-103 of 
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility expressly makes Canon 7 applicable to lawyer-
candidates for judicial office. Losing candidates are generally still members of the bar, of course, 
but Professor Schotland suggests an unwillingness among state bar associations to punish col-
leagues for campaign violations. The fact that incumbent judges are much more likely to be 
punished for questionable campaign activity than their challengers led California to suspend Ca-
non 7(B) altogether. Schotland, supra, at 91. 
Professor Schotland also points to the problem of devising effective sanctions for ethical viola-
tions when the stakes are so high. Id. at 92-93. Apart from steps like impeachment that would 
reverse the election result, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1404.l (1981), it would be difficult to 
deter even successful candidates from pursuing a "win at all costs" strategy if the moral force of 
the ethical considerations is not enough. 
19. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) commentary (1972). 
20. Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 374. The amount varies from zero (in Maryland, 
New Mexico, Ohio, and Wyoming) to $2,000 (in Louisiana). Id. at 374 n.140. 
21. See note 8 supra. 
22. In any particular case, the probability of unconstitutional bias is perhaps independent of 
whether the contribution in question came from a party's attorney or from the party himself. 
Hence, many of the arguments of Part II, that judges may be unconstitutionally biased by attor-
ney contributions, might seem also to apply to contributions made by parties. However, this 
Note considers only attorney contributions, for two reasons. 
First, in the absence of pending litigation, few nonlawyers can be thought to contribute to 
judges specifically in order to curry favor, for the simple reason that few nonlawyers are in court 
often enough to be able to say with any confidence that they will ever appear before a particular 
judge. (The appropriate exceptions are discussed in note 85 infra.) This means not only that the 
problem is less serious in statistical terms, but also that the judge has little reason to believe that 
the litigant's support depends upon the judge's verdict, and accordingly less reason to tip the 
scales in favor of the contributor. 
Second, a different remedy may be indicated when it is a party rather than an attorney who 
contributes. Part III.A argues that the sheer volume of lawyer contributions, see note 6 supra, 
makes judicial recusal an unsatisfactory remedy. Because the discussion of these difficult reme-
dial questions does not apply to situations that occur less frequently, the problem of nonlawyer 
contributions has been omitted entirely. 
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under the due process clause,23 to a fair and impartial forum. 24 From 
this constitutional perspective, a judge's technical compliance with the 
ere or other state regulatory statutes25 is irrelevant. Instead, the in-
quiry is simply whether the forum is a fair one. If not, then settled due 
process doctrine requires that the litigant have the opportunity to be 
heard in a forum which is fair. 26 
This Note will argue that the improprieties arising from some cam-
paign contributions are so egregious that they offend the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, states must either 
reform judicial campaigns to eliminate such improprieties, or, through 
mandatory judicial recusal or disqualification,27 respect the absolute 
constitutional right to an impartial forum. Part I of this Note will 
23. " ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of Jaw .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
24. The Supreme Court has said of this right, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic require· 
ment of due process .... To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is 
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 
136 (1955). 
25. In addition to the requirements of the CJC which apply in most states, see note 10 supra, 
most states have statutes or constitutional provisions respecting disqualification of judges. See 
ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.19; ALA. CooE § 12-1-12 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.20.020, 
22.20.022, 22.30.070 (1982); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, §§ 2, 4; ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 20; CAL. 
CONST. art. VI, §§ 17, 18; CAL. C1v. PROC. CoDE §§ 170 through 170.7 (West 1982); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 16-6-201 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 38.01-.03, 
38.10 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-8 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 601·7 (1985); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, para. 67, 68 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE 
§ 33-2.1-8·2 (1976); IOWA CODE§ 605.17 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 20-311 (1981); LA. CODE 
C1v. PROC. ANN. art. 151-61(West1981 & Supp. 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 671-
79 (West 1981); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 2; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (Supp. 1987); 
Mo. CONST. art. IV,§ 7; MINN. STAT.§§ 487.40, 542.13, 542.16 (1982); Miss. CONST. art. VI, 
§ 165; Miss. CODE ANN.§ 11-1-11 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 476.180, 508.090 (1986); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 3-1-802 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-315 (1985); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35th; 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:l5-49 (West 1952); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. Juo. LAW § 14 
(McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-83(3), 15A-1223 (1983 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CONST. 
art. VI, § 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.20 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 1401-
04.1 (1981 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 14.110, 14.210, 14.250 (1985); s.c. CONST. art. V, 
§ 15; s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-130, 14-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§§ 15-12-2 through .37 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 17-2-101 (1980); TEX. CONST. art. v, §§ 11, 
16; TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1969); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
30.01 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-1 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 61 (Supp. 
1987); VA. CODE ANN.§ 17·7 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE§ 4.12.030(4) (1985); W. VA. CODE 
§ 51-2-8 (1981); WIS. STAT. § 757.19 (1983-1984). 
26. See notes 81-119 infra and accompanying text. 
27. Technically, there is a distinction between recusal and disqualification. Disqualification 
involves the removal of jurisdiction by force of Jaw; thus it is grounds for collateral attack, is not 
subject to the judge's discretion, and is generally not waivable. In contrast, recusal involves only 
considerations of propriety. This once meaningful distinction is far less important today. Frank, 
Disqualification of Judges: Jn Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 & 
n. 7 (1970) (asserting that changes in the federal disqualification statute have made the term 
recusal "largely obsolete"). But see Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualificatio11 and Recusal of Judges, 
17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 599 (1986) (describing the distinction as it still exists in Texas). The distinc· 
tion is not important in the context of this Note, since due process is offended by the fact that the 
judge is sitting in the case, not by the subordinate rule of Jaw which the judge may or may not 
have violated in doing so. This Note thus follows Frank and uses the terms interchangeably. 
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examine the history of disqualification at common law and in Ameri-
can practice, focusing on the extent to which it has been held to be a 
requirement of due process. Part II will argue that under the applica-
ble due process standards, a litigant may successfully move to disqual-
ify a judge who has accepted substantial political contributions from 
the opposing party or counsel. Part III will discuss the inadequacy of 
judicial recusal - the usual remedy for a denial of an impartial forum 
- as a remedy in the context of judicial campaign contributions from 
lawyers. Part III will also suggest that preventing improper influence, 
by severely limiting lawyers' contributions to judicial candidates, is the 
best way for states with elected judiciaries to ensure the impartiality of 
their judges. 
I. THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL FORUM 
A state normally possesses the power to regulate the administra-
tion of justice within its jurisdiction, subject only to the commands of 
the United States Constitution.28 The particular command embodied 
in the fourteenth amendment, that no person be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law, is violated only when 
state action "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."29 
A survey of the evolution of the idea of impartiality from its common-
law origins to its present-day constitutional status illustrates just how 
fundamental the notion of impartiality has been in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 
A. The Evolution of the Law of Disqualification 
At common law, the only recognized ground for disqualification 
was pecuniary interest. 30 This rule was merely a specific application of 
the broad principle that no man should be a judge in his own cause,31 
applied in 1608 by Sir Edward Coke in Bonham's Case. 32 Thomas 
Bonham was a doctor who was denied a license to practice "physic" 
by several other doctors designated by the King as "censors." When 
Bonham continued to practice, he was fined; and when he refused to 
pay the fine directly to the censors, they imprisoned him. Lord Coke 
rendered judgment for Bonham in his suit for false imprisonment, 
holding that "[t]he censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties; 
judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and 
28. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). 
29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1585 (1986) (quoting Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)). 
30. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947). 
31. "It is against reason, that if wrong be done any man, that he thereof should be his own 
judge." I E. COKE, INSTITUTES *141a. 
32. 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608). 
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parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture .... "33 Lord Coke thought 
this principle so fundamental that it controlled even the Act of Parlia-
ment and patent of King Henry VIII which authorized the state of 
affairs in Bonham's Case. 34 
Common-law judges were apparently willing to apply the concept 
of "interest" very broadly. For instance, the court in the Case of 
Foxham and Tithing 35 quashed an order affecting the office of the sur-
veyor of the highways because the current surveyor was also a justice 
of the peace whose name appeared in the caption of the order. And 
the court in Between the Parishes of Great Charte and Kennington 36 
quashed an order removing a pauper from one of the parishes because 
one of the justices of the peace issuing the order was an inhabitant of 
the parish whose taxes would be affected by the decision.37 
As strict as the early English judges were about disqualification for 
interest, it is somewhat surprising that they thought neither general 
bias38 nor relationship to a party sufficient for disqualification. 39 The 
33. 8 Coke at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
34. 8 Coke at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. The letters patent, which Coke quoted in Latin, 
quite clearly authorize the President and Censors of the College of London to act as censors over 
all who practiced within seven miles of the city of London. Furthermore, the King had directed 
that any fines imposed by the censors were to be evenly divided between the censors and the 
King. The King also specifically approved imprisonment as a method of compelling payment. 
Parliament later ratified these concessions of the King. See 8 Coke at l 14a-b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 
647-48. I am indebted to the Reverend Eric McDermott, S.J., and the Reverend J.P.M. Walsh, 
S.J., both of Georgetown University, for translating the Latin quoted by Coke. See also 
Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 32 (1926). 
35. 2 Salkend 607, 91 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B. 1705). 
36. 2 Strange 1173, 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B. 1726). 
37. 2 Strange at 1173, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1107-08. This strict common-law rule is generally 
rejected today. Frank, supra note 30, at 614. It has been reversed by statute in some jurisdic-
tions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (1983); LA. CODE C!V. PROC. ANN. art. 151(B) (West 
Supp. 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 671 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 220, § 10 
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:15-49 (1986); N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 15 (McKinney 1983); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 61 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE§ 51-3-6 (1981). 
The court in Great Charte and Kennington intimated that the justices might be allowed to sit 
in such a case if all the justices in a particular town would be similarly disqualified. 2 Strange at 
1173, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1108. Parliament later responded to this suggestion by providing that 
justices of the peace were not disqualified simply because they pay taxes. This is apparently the 
beginning of what is now known as the "Rule of Necessity." Frank, supra note 30, at 61 I. 
Under the Rule of Necessity a judge, even though disqualified from hearing a particular case, 
may nonetheless hear the case if no determination could otherwise be had. For a recent applica· 
tion of the Rule of Necessity, sec United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). The Rule of Neces-
sity is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 148-61 infra. 
38. See Frank, supra note 30, at 618-19. In common parlance, the word "bias" would in· 
clude concepts like financial interest and nepotistic tendencies. However, as used in discu~sions 
of disqualification, "bias" refers to "less tangible prejudices for or against a party, a lawyer, or a 
cause." Id. at 619. "Bias" is thus a term of art which excludes these more particular concepts by 
definition. As an original matter, this taxonomy would have little to commend it, but the crca· 
tion of a new one at this point has even less. Therefore, "bias" is used throughout this Note as 
shorthand for the wide variety of personal antipathies (not arising from pecuniary interest) that 
might underlie "a tendency or inclination to treat a particular litigant more or less generously 
than a different litigant raising the identical legal issue." Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About 
Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694, 709 (1973) (calling this concept "favoritism"), 
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reason that Blackstone gave was that 
the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is 
already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority 
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. And should the fact at 
any time prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of the law will not pre-
sume beforehand, there is no doubt but that such misbehavior would 
draw down a heavy censure from those to whom the judge is accountable 
for his conduct.40 
Early American courts differed with Blackstone on at least two 
points. First, Americans placed less reliance on the judge's own desire 
to avoid the "heavy censure" of which Blackstone spoke, choosing in-
stead to make disqualification mandatory in certain types of situa-
tions. 41 Second, jurists on this side of the Atlantic realized that the 
impartiality of the forum might be compromised for reasons other 
than pecuniary interest. Accordingly, they came to focus on the sim-
ple question of whether the forum was impartial with less regard for 
the particular reason why impartiality might be lacking.4~ Soon state 
courts and legislatures required disqualification for relationship to par-
ties or attorneys, and for a number of types of bias.43 At the same 
time, the principle of pecuniary interest was extended by analogy to 
other types of interest created by changing economic institutions,44 
such as the rise of the corporate form. 45 
In addition to these departures from the Blackstonian rule, Ameri-
can expansion of disqualification rested on a new interpretation of 
Blackstone's principle that the presumption of impartiality was the 
linchpin of judicial authority and legitimacy.46 To Blackstone, this 
meant that judicial impartiality was too important an assumption to be 
doubted, except perhaps in cases of the most egregious violations of 
the assumption.47 However, American jurists reached the opposite 
conclusion: that judges must exercise the utmost care to avoid any 
39. Frank, supra note 30, at 611-12. Relationship is "the problem posed where a judge par-
ticipates in a case involving his relative." Id. at 611. Apparently jurors could be disqualified for 
relationship even though judges could not. Id. 
40. 3 W. BLACKSfONE, COMMENTARIES *361. 
41. Note, Disqualification of Judges Because of Bias and Prejudice, 51 YALE L.J. 169, 169 
(1941). 
42. "Despite Blackstone's denial that bias could exist as a ground for disqualification a more 
recent humility has prompted recognition that human judges may deny justice not only for profit 
or to benefit a kinsman, but for less tangible prejudices for or against a party, a lawyer, or a 
cause." Frank, supra note 30, at 619. 
43. Id. at 612. 
44. Id. 
45. For instance, judges were disqualified for owning stock in a party-corporation, or for 
being an officer of the corporation, or even for being the executor of an estate with stock in the 
corporation. Id. at 613-14. 
46. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
47. Id. 
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public suspicion of impropriety, so as not to diminish public respect 
for the judiciary. As the Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison, 
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. 
But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness .... Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar 
trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best 
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to 
perform its high function in the best way "justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice."48 
Hence, in order to preserve its legitimacy, our judicial system admon-
ishes bench and bar alike to avoid even the appearance of 
impropriety. 49 
48. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 
14 (1954)). This language has been quoted recently with approval in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1587 (1986). 
However, note the ambiguity in the quotation between appearance in the probabilistic sense 
("probability of unfairness") and appearance in the truly cosmetic sense ("appearance of jus-
tice"). For one highly placed commentator's argument that our system has exaggerated the 
cosmetic aspect in situations where "no reasonable person .•. could fairly conclude that the 
judge's vote might even be subconsciously influenced," see Rehnquist, supra note 38, at 696-702. 
In this article (then-) Justice Rehnquist stresses that, absent special circumstances, it is a judge's 
duty to hear the cases before him - a duty that should not be lightly cast aside: 
I do not think our profession will be well served by the creation of a climate of professional 
opinion in which the kudos invariably go to the judge who is quickest to disqualify himself, 
for such a climate could easily bring about a situation in which, to use Judge Hand's words, 
only "the most resolute or the most irresponsible" judges would sit in cases in which they 
ought to sit. 
Id. at 713. Although these remarks were made in reference to disqualification generally, with no 
special emphasis on the constitutional standards, they would seem to apply a fortiori to the con-
stitutional limitations which the court has found in the due process clause, see Part I.B i11fra. 
Hence, unless the current Chief Justice has changed his mind on this matter, at least one member 
of the Supreme Court can be counted upon to ignore mere appearances of impropriety if they arc 
unaccompanied by reasonable probabilities of actual favoritism. The constitutional importance 
of appearance to the other Justices is not clear, but Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to espouse 
the orthodox view, see note 49 infra. 
49. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981). The importance of the "appearance of impropriety" rationale 
in the realm of constitutional standards is far less clear than its importance at common law. On 
the one hand, the Supreme Court has often referred to the appearance of a particular arrange-
ment when it strikes it down for some other reason. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 
(1974) (reversing contempt conviction for lack of notice, inadequate opportunity to be heard, and 
likelihood that judge would be biased by the contemnor's courtroom antics) ("inquiry must be 
not only whether there was actual bias on [the judge's] part, but also whether there was 'such a 
likelihood of bias or an appeara11ce of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between 
vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused' " (emphasis added)); text 
accompanying note 48 supra. On the other hand, it is difficult to read any case as holding a 
judge's participation unconstitutional solely because it might look improper. 
The actual probability of unfairness was emphasized in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 
(1975) (upholding a medical discipline panel against a charge of unconstitutional bias). There 
Justice White stated for a unanimous Court that a charge of bias would succeed only if, "under a 
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, [the challenged practice] 
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guaran-
tee of due process is to be adequately implemented." 421 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). As 
Withrow v. Larki11 illustrates, the Court seems much more concerned with probabilities than with 
appearances, and the "appearance of impropriety" language seems to be mere icing on the 
"probability of unfairness" cake. But see Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process a11d Separa-
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B. The Constitutional Law of Disqualification 
The constitutional standards of disqualification have developed in 
many of the same factual settings as the common-law and statutory 
standards.so However, not all of the common-law grounds for dis-
qualification are of constitutional magnitude.st In general, the situa-
tions in which disqualification is constitutionally required are the most 
shocking variations on the common-law themes, leading one authority 
to characterize the constitutional safeguards as "the inner core of dis-
qualification. "s2 The Supreme Court has often borrowed common-law 
terms such as "interest" or "bias" as shorthand for the factual situa-
tions in constitutional "impartial forum" adjudication, but the sub-
stance of the constitutional disqualification decisions generally follows 
the American trend toward generalization in this area. s3 Hence, the 
"impartial forum" decisions eschew the common-law tendency to en-
gage in outcome-determinative categorization of factual settings. In-
stead, the Court has concentrated on the ultimate question of 
impartiality. 
Unfortunately, the Court has been inconsistent in its articulation of 
the standard of impartiality to be applied. The Supreme Court has 
used at least two formulations in different cases: the "possible tempta-
tion" test, s4 and the "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" 
test.ss However, regardless of which way the Court phrases the test it 
applies, the emphasis is on the degree of danger to the impartial ad-
ministration of justice, rather than the cause of the danger. 
tion of Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1676-77 (1985) 
(reading Taylor and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (trial judge who was the 
object of the contemnor's insolent conduct could not be impartial in later contempt conviction), 
for the proposition that appearance alone is sufficient). 
The proposition that appearance of impropriety alone does not violate the due process clause 
is probably also "the better view." After all, the concern for avoiding the appearance of impro-
priety is usually based upon preserving public respect for the law. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 EC 9-1, -2, -4, -6 (1981). The degree to which the 
people of a state wish their legal system to be publicly respected would seem to be a matter of 
state autonomy, and if a litigant receives a trial which is fair in fact, it is difficult to see how his 
right to due process oflaw is violated merely because his fellow citizens believe otherwise. Cf. C. 
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 319-23 (criticizing the "appearance" standard as it is misused in the 
context of lawyer conflicts of interest). 
50. Compare, e.g., Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608) (discussed in 
text at notes 32-34 supra), with Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (involving licensing 
decisions made by a board of optometrists who stood to gain by restricting the number of 
licenses). . 
51. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1584 (1986); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510, 523 (1927). 
52. Frank, supra note 27, at 4S. 
S3. See text accompanying notes 42-4S supra. 
54. See text accompanying notes 56-60, 101-19 infra. 
SS. See text accompanying notes 56-S9, 83-100 infra. 
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1. Tumey v. Ohio: Interest or Bias? 
The seminal case on constitutional disqualification is Tumey v. 
Ohio. 56 Tumey was tried and convicted by the Mayor of the Village of 
North College Hill, Ohio for violating Ohio's Prohibition Act. The 
statutes in question gave the Mayor a right to $12 in costs for himself 
and a $100 fine for the village only if Tumey were convicted. On the 
basis of this interest, Tumey moved to disqualify the Mayor, but the 
Mayor denied that request. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed Tumey's conviction, 
holding that the Mayor was disqualified from hearing the case because 
of his interest in the result. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unani-
mous Court noted that while disqualification for interest was "the gen-
eral rule,"57 some questions of judicial qualification "would seem 
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion."58 
But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a de-
fendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or 
property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against 
him in his case. 59 
Had the opinion ended there, the rule of Tumey v. Ohio would be both 
simple and historically familiar: every litigant is entitled to a judge 
without "a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the out-
come. However, the opinion did not end there. Addressing the fact 
that the Mayor was only interested to the extent of $12, the Chief 
Justice wrote: 
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as 
$12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the requirement 
of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argu-
ment that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could 
carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would 
offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead 
56. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
57. 273 U.S. at 522. 
58. 273 U.S. at 523. 
59. 273 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Taft's suggestion that the impartiality 
requirement might be limited to criminal cases has not stood the test of time. Until recently, no 
case had squarely held the requirement applicable to civil cases. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional 
Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 624 (1984) (calling the absence of any decision so hold-
ing "the most extraordinary gap in our constitutional law of civil procedure"). However, a dic-
tum in Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), 
asserted that the due process clause entitled litigants to a fair and impartial tribunal "in both civil 
and criminal cases." 446 U.S. at 242. There was never much reason to doubt the Court's dic-
tum; none of the opinions in the criminal and administrative situations in which the Court has 
developed the right to an impartial tribunal have limited its scope to criminal or administrative 
cases, or employed reasoning that does not apply with equal force to the civil realm. However, 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, J06 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) (applying the impartiality requirement in a 
civil action), removes all doubt. The Lavoie case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 64-
66 & 89-95 infra. 
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him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the 
accused, denies the latter due process of law. 60 
This "possible temptation" language appears much broader than the 
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary" language, and it is difficult to 
tell whether it simply amplifies the earlier test or instead suggests an 
independent standard. 
Apparently, the Court applied two independent tests in Tumey. 
Chief Justice Taft noted that the Mayor's pecuniary interest was not 
the only aspect of Mr. Tumey's trial which violated the strictures of 
the due process clause. 61 An alternative basis for the holding was that 
Mayor Pugh's capacity as the executive of his village placed him in 
"two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and 
the other judicial, [which] necessarily involves a lack of due process of 
law."62 Hence, the disqualification resulted "both because of his direct 
pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official 
motive. " 63 
2. The Standard After Tumey 
The alternative holdings in Tumey left the proper standard in 
doubt. Was the due process clause violated whenever there existed 
"possible temptation" to depart from neutrality? Or was it necessary 
for the litigant asking for disqualification to show that the judge had a 
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary" interest in the outcome? As 
recently as two terms ago, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Burger, treated the matter as an open question in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie. 64 In that case Aetna challenged Alabama Supreme Court Jus-
tice Embry's refusal to disqualify himself from consideration of a case 
even though he was a party to an essentially identical suit pending in a 
lower state court. The Court found Justice Embry to have been im-
permissibly interested, but brushed aside Aetna's allegations of bias, 
writing: 
We need not decide whether allegations of bias or prejudice by a judge of 
60. 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added). The proposition that the apparent insignificance of 
the amount does not preclude a finding of impermissible interest was reaffirmed more recently in 
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), in which the Court applied Tumey to strike down a 
Georgia statutory scheme whereby nonsalaried justices of the peace were paid $5 for each search 
warrant issued, but nothing for each search warrant denied. 
61. 273 U.S. at 532. 
62. 273 U.S. at 534. 
63. 273 U.S. at 535. That either ground of disqualification would have been sufficient by 
itself is indicated by Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). There the Court, again speaking 
through Chief Justice Taft, upheld' a conviction and fine imposed by the Mayor of Xenia, Ohio. 
Chief Justice Taft thought it necessary to emphasize both that "[t]he mayor of Xenia receives a 
salary which is not dependent on whether he convicts in any case or not," 277 U.S. at 65, and 
that "[t]he mayor has no executive, and exercises only judicial, functions," 277 U.S. at 63. The 
negation of both aspects of Tumey strongly suggests that either one would have been sufficient by 
itself. 
64. 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986). 
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the type we have here would ever be sufficient under the Due Process 
Clause to force recusal. Certainly only in the most extreme of cases 
would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required, and ap-
pellant's arguments here fall well below that level. 65 
As Lavoie shows, the confusion over the proper standard has been ag-
gravated by the considerable degree to which the two standards ap-
plied in Tumey overlap. 66 
Careful examination of the decisions since Tumey suggests that 
when both Tumey standards are applicable, the Supreme Court prefers 
to rely on pecuniary interest. For instance, in Gibson v. Berryhill, 67 a 
group of optometrists successfully challenged a state delicensing pro-
cedure as a violation of their due process rights to an impartial forum. 
The "unprofessional conduct" with which the plaintiff optometrists 
were charged consisted of accepting employment from a corporate 
chain rather than establishing independent practices. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the State Board of Optometry was biased against "corpo-
rate" optometrists, and that the state-law procedure was for that rea-
son bound to result in their delicensing, depriving them of their 
livelihoods without due process of law. The district court agreed and 
enjoined the state-law administrative proceeding,68 finding both bias69 
and interest. 70 The Supreme Court affirmed solely on the basis of im-
permissible interest, although the majority opinion intimated that the 
ruling as to impermissible bias was also correct.71 
However, there have been many cases in which bias was present 
but pecuniary interest was not, and in these cases the Court has not 
hesitated to rely solely on the broader "possible temptation" test. One 
such case was In re Murchison, 72 which involved a challenge to Michi-
65. 106 S. Ct. at 1585. The "bias" asserted in Lavoie - a "general frustration with insurance 
companies,'' 106 S. Ct. at 1585-was clearly not in the same league with the "interest" asserted, 
see notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text, and one can scarcely quarrel with the Court's 
decision to rely only on the latter ground. 
66. Presumably, most interests which are "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary" 
also create "possible temptation[s] ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and true." Hence, the 
Court is usually able to rely on the more traditional ground of pecuniary interest. 
67. 411 U.S. 564 (1973). 
68. 411 U.S. at 570-71. 
69. 411 U.S. at 578. The district court identified two possible causes of bias. First, the Board 
consisted exclusively of members of the Alabama Optometric Association, which excluded cor-
-porate optometrists. Second, the Board had performed a prosecutorial role in charging the plain-
tiffs with unprofessional conduct, and this prosecutorial role was bound to induce preconceived 
notions of guilt. 411 U.S. at 578. 
70. 411 U.S. at 578. The "interest" involved was the fact that delicensing all "corporate" 
optometrists would have cut the number of optometrists practicing in the state nearly in half. 
411 U.S. at 578. 
71. 411 U.S. at 579. Justice White, speaking for the majority, wrote that "[a]rguably, the 
District Court was right on both scores, but we need reach, and we affirm, only the latter ground 
of possible personal interest." 411 U.S. at 579. 
72. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
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gan's "one-man grand jury" law73 whereby any judge of the state 
could compel witnesses to testify before him in secret about suspected 
crimes. Murchison was interrogated at length in secret, but the 
judge-grand jury, apparently unconvinced by Murchison's testimony, 
proceeded to charge, try, convict, and sentence Murchison for con-
tempt. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that 
the judge was biased by his concurrent role as grand jury. 74 The 
Court, over three dissenting votes, 75 explicitly relied on the "possible 
temptation" language from Tumey. 16 
More recently, the Court was faced with a descendant of the 
Tumey "mayor's court" in Ward v. Village of Monroeville. 77 In Ward, 
as in Tumey, the Mayor convicted the accused of violating a municipal 
ordinance and fined him. However in Ward, unlike in Tumey, the 
Mayor did not receive any portion of the fines collected from traffic 
violators, and thus no "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary inter-
est" was present. On this score, Justice Brennan wrote for the Court 
that "[t]he fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in the fees 
and costs did not define the limits of the principle. "78 The test, he 
said, was the "possible temptation" standard from Tumey, 79 and 
under this test the Mayor's conflicting responsibilities for revenue pro-
73. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
74. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137-38. For other rulings to this effect in contempt cases, see 
note 103 infra. The Supreme Court has also cautioned against the combination of prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory functions in other contexts. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197-98 
(1974) (White, J., concurring) (federal employee's pretermination hearing must be conducted by 
someone other than the supervisor accused of slandering the employee); Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (parole revocation hearing must be conducted by someone other 
than the parole officer who ordered the defendant's arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 449-53 (1970) (search warrant may not be issued by state attorney general directing 
investigation of crime); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (termination of welfare 
benefits requires a hearing before a decisionmaker who did not participate in the determination 
under review); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968) (absence of an impartial 
factfinder at hearing to review teacher's dismissal deprived the Board of Education's findings of 
weight and justified Supreme Court's independent review of the record); but see Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (assistant regional administrator of child labor enforce-
ment agency not subject to strict requirement of neutrality, since his function was less judicial 
than prosecutorial, and prosecutors "are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement 
of the law"); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (medical examining board's authority to 
investigate physicians, present charges, rule upon the charges, and impose punishment does not 
violate due process); FfC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948) (even if commissioners were 
biased by their prior roles as prosecutors, requirement of impartiality was satisfied as long as 
their minds were not "irrevocably closed"). 
75. 349 U.S. at 139 (Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting, joined by Burton, J.). 
76. 349 U.S. at 136. Interestingly, the dissenters noted the majority's heavy reliance upon 
Tumey but did not squarely confront the appropriateness of the "possible temptation" standard, 
choosing instead merely to quote the "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" test in 
response. 349 U.S. at 142 (Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting, joined by Burton, J.). 
77. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
78. 409 U.S. at 60. 
79. 409 U.S. at 60. 
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duction and law enforcement80 infected the Ohio adjudicatory scheme 
with constitutional invalidity. 
In summary, it appears from Ward and Murchison that the more 
general "possible temptation" standard from Tumey not only survives, 
but envelops the older and narrower "direct, personal, substantial, pe-
cuniary interest" test, even though the Supreme Court may refer only 
to the narrower of the two when it has a choice. Part II analyzes the 
constitutional status of campaign contributions under these standards. 
II. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO AN 
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL 
The constitutional tests described in Part I suggest two distinct 
ways in which a campaign contribution might constitute grounds for 
disqualification under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. First, the campaign contribution may give the judge an imper-
missible financial interest in the litigation under Tumey's "direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary" standard.81 Alternatively, whether 
or not campaign contributions constitute "interest," they may none-
theless be "possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true,"82 under the broader of the 
Tumey standards. 
A. Contributions as Interest 
Campaign contributions are certainly "personal" and "pecuniary," 
and they may often be "substantial."83 But can the interest created by 
a campaign contribution ever be so "direct" that it violates the four-
teenth amendment? 
One answer which seems initially plausible is that a campaign con-
tribution cannot be "interest" of any kind because it is wholly unre-
lated to the litigation. Because the contribution has by hypothesis 
preceded the judgment, the judge keeps the money regardless of the 
result in the litigation. It is tempting to conclude that this state of 
affairs, far from constituting a "direct" interest in the litigation, shows 
that there is in fact no correlation whatsoever between the outcome 
and the contribution. 
However, this argument ignores the fact that the contributors in 
question here are typically lawyers, who are interested in the judge as 
much for his general responsiveness to their arguments as for his deci-
sion in an isolated case. They have, by hypothesis, made prior contri-
80. It was on this basis that the Court distinguished Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928), 
discussed in note 63 supra. 409 U.S. at 60-61. 
81. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
82. See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
83. See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra. 
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butions to a particular judge's campaign, and it is entirely reasonable 
for the judge to assume that they will continue to contribute as long as 
the contributor remains satisfied with the judge's performance. In 
short, there may be a "course of dealing"84 between the judge and the 
lawyer-contributor85 which makes it reasonable for the judge to weigh 
the importance of the contributor's continued support in arriving at a 
decision. 86 
Still, in the absence of actual bribery, 87 a campaign contribution is 
hardly direct in the same way that the $12 fee in Tumey was direct. In 
Tumey, a verdict of guilty put $12 in the judge's pocket, while aver-
dict of not guilty left the judge uncompensated for trying the case. 
Even if a judge assumes that he must keep a particular contributor 
happy in general, the contributor surely cannot expect to win every 
case before the judge; thus, the interest in any particular case would 
seem to be something less than "direct." 
However, the Supreme Court has not always required the direct-
ness present in Tumey. In Lavoie, 88 for example, Justice Embry's only 
interest in the outcome was its precedential value: the fact that his 
decision approved the largest punitive damage award of its kind in 
Alabama history presumably enhanced the settlement value of Justice 
Embry's own suit against a different insurer. 89 Although the Court 
characterized this effect of Justice Embry's decision as "clear and im-
mediate,"90 it is certainly a far cry from the directness involved in 
taking $12 out of Mr. Tumey's pocket and placing it in Mayor 
84. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1978): "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct 
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a 
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." 
85. A similar "course of dealing" may arise with nonattorneys who are so-called "institu-
tional litigants"; i.e., those litigants who find themselves in court so often that costs incurred in 
any one case may yield benefits in a whole range of other cases in the future. See D. LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 855-56 (1985) (drawing a distinction between "one-shotters" 
and "repeat players"). These litigants may know in advance that they will have a significant 
number of cases before a particular judge simply by virtue of the frequency with which they sue 
or are sued. Just as these litigants may treat a favorable result in an otherwise insignificant case 
as an asset to be used in other cases, cf. Fairchild, Comment, 19 U. CHI. CONF. SERIES 9, 16 
(1964), the favorable disposition of a judge is an asset which can be every bit as important to 
these litigants as it is to a lawyer who practices often in the judge's court. 
The difficulty with treating such litigants as lawyers for the purpose of due process analysis is 
that it is difficult to draw any principled distinction between an "institutional litigant" and a 
regular litigant that could reliably identify the former, let alone justify dissimilar treatment. 
86. Note, however, that such a "course of dealing" is only relevant (indeed, only possible) 
where the judge must someday campaign again. Thus, a system in which judges were elected to 
life terms would avoid this particular constitutional difficulty, although it might still be subject to 
the problems of bias explored in Part H.B. No state currently employs such a system. L. BERK· 
SON, s. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, supra note 2, at 1-46. 
87. See note 8 supra. 
88. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra. 
89. 106 S. Ct. at 1586. 
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1586. 
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Pugh's.91 
While nothing in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Lavoie 
explained the type of directness required, Justice Brennan's concur-
rence92 was more helpful. He pointed out that the Court had found 
due process violations in cases where the "direct, personal, substantial, 
pecuniary" test was not met. 93 But he also maintained that even under 
this test, "an interest is sufficiently 'direct' if the outcome of the chal-
lenged proceeding substantially advances the judge's opportunity to 
attain some desired goal even if that goal is not actually attained in 
that proceeding."94 Under this standard, the inquiry should be 
whether a particular outcome substantially advances a judge's chance 
of reelection. 
The pervasive influence of money on modem elections demands 
that substantial contributions be considered direct interest under this 
standard. A survey of California judges conducted by the California 
Judges' Association is informative in this connection.95 One judge 
who responded to the survey wrote, "[M]y 'reasons for winning' . . . 
are as follows: (1) Money; (2) Organization; (3) An early start; (4) 
Money; (5) An 'excellent' candidate; (6) A weak opponent; (7) Excel-
lent public relations and use of media advice; (8) Money; (9) Luck."96 
Elaborating on the importance of money, this respondent opined that 
"[t]here is no way in a metropolitan area [of four hundred thousand 
registered voters] that you can do anything effective without a large 
amount of money since both electronic media and direct mail are very 
costly."97 This need for funding has a predictable effect on the way 
judges view attorney support. As another respondent wrote, "I would 
solicit and expect more help from local attorneys next time. Because 
of the ethical problems, I avoided the whole issue. If the Bar wants 
competent judges (and in my case the issue was clear) it must get down 
in the dirt with us. " 98 When there is reason to believe that a judge 
91. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra. 
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. 
93. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. Justice Brennan cited Murchison, discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 72-76 supra, as an example. 
94. 106 S. Ct. at 1589-90. Justice Brennan cited Ward, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), discussed in the 
text accompanying notes 77-80 supra, and Gibson, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 67-71 supra, for this proposition, and added, "Nothing in the Court's opin· 
ion should be read, as I understand it, to limit these precedents in any way." 106 S. Ct. at 1590. 
95. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 155. 
96. Id. (emphasis in original). Perhaps it is reassuring that the relative merits of the candi· 
dates finished ahead of "luck" in importance, but still one might have hoped for higher showings 
than fifth and sixth. In any event, the quality factor lost two out of three to money. 
97. Id. A Northwestern Law School professor who ran a losing campaign concurs. "My 
runningmates and I had substantial funding, around $175,000, ... but still there was time to tell 
the voter little more than he or she is told in an equal amount of time about the comparative 
effectiveness of Duz and Dash." Waltz, Some Firsthand Observations on the Election of Judges, 
63 JUDICATURE 185, 186-87 (1979). 
98. Schotland, supra note 18, at 155 (emphasis added). 
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depends upon one of the attorneys before him for the financial support 
he so desperately needs, the judge should be deemed to have an inter-
est in the outcome which is sufficiently direct under the Brennan test 
that it offends due process. 
Justice Brennan's test for the directness of the interest is consistent 
not only with the precedent he cites, but also with the modern empha-
sis on the fact of partiality rather than its cause.99 Under that test, it 
seems clear that some campaign contributions are significant enough 
that it would constitute a denial of due process for the recipient to 
preside over a case involving the donor. Just as the common-law con-
cept of interest expanded with changing economic conditions to in-
clude interests such as the ownership of stock in a corporate party, 100 
the constitutional concept of interest should now broaden to encom-
pass a judge's reasonable expectation of continued political support. 
B. Campaign Contributions as ''Possible Temptation" 
If a particularly large campaign contribution constitutes a "direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," it is a fortiori a "possible 
temptation to the average man as judge . . . not to hold the balance 
nice, clear and true." 101 Hence, the arguments of Part II.A apply with 
even greater force to the possible temptation standard than to the pe-
cuniary interest test. Under this broader standard the question is no 
longer whether campaign contributions can be categorized as "inter-
est"; it is now whether certain large contributions from attorneys af-
fect the impartiality of sitting judges.102 Even if advancing one's 
chance of reelection is not a direct pecuniary interest, it must be pre-
sumed to be a temptation for anyone who is actually running for office. 
However, there are independent reasons to question the impartial-
ity of judges when major contributors practice before them. These 
reasons have to do not with the judge's expectation of future gain, but 
rather with the extent to which the judge is favorably or unfavorably 
disposed toward a litigant as a result of past support. Supreme Court 
decisions in analogous areas suggest that this personal favoritism may 
sometimes rise to unconstitutional levels. 
The easiest analogy is to the law of contempt. In this area, the 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that unless immediate action by 
the trial judge is necessary to prevent hindrance of the administration 
of justice, a judge who has been personally insulted or angered by al-
99. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra. 
100. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. 
101. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) 
102. Consider the shift in emphasis from the early common law to the later common law and 
statutory law on disqualification, discussed in the text accompanying notes 42·45 supra, as well 
as the tendency toward generalization which has animated the constitutional "impartial forum" 
decisions, discussed in the text accompanying notes 64-80 supra. 
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legedly contemptible behavior may sit at the contempt hearing only at 
the risk of denying due process of law. 103 The theory of these cases is 
not that the trial judge has anything to gain by holding the defendant 
in contempt, but rather that impartiality is not possible because of 
prior dealings between the two. 104 
The same reasoning applies to situations where one of the parties is 
a large contributor to the judge's election campaign. 105 Even if the 
judge has no reason to expect that the supporter in question will stop 
contributing as soon as the judge renders an adverse decision, the 
judge's sympathies in the situation will be altered. 106 This is not to say 
that all judges or even most judges will twist and bend the law until it 
comes out in their supporters' favor. 107 It is only to say that the non-
supporter has reason to fear that he is starting with a handicap in such 
circumstances, and "possible temptation" exists regardless of whether 
or not the judge actually fails to discharge his duty of impartiality. 
This personal bias may sometimes operate in situations that seem 
at first blush to involve far less probability of unfairness than either the 
contempt cases just examined or the political contribution scenario. 
For instance, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 108 Justice 
Frankfurter recused himself from a case challenging the District of 
Columbia's practice of broadcasting radio programs in public bus-
ses.109 He noted, "My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of 
the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial 
judgment upon it." 110 The degree of bias present in that case might 
103. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 
(1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
104. See Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465; Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17-18; Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539. Cj 
the problem of conspicuous noncontributors raised in note 8 supra. 
105. If anything the argument is stronger in the context of campaign contributions. In con-
tempt proceedings, at least it is the behavior of the contemnor that is in question. However, a 
litigant who is disadvantaged by an opposing attorney's political support for the judge will in 
most cases have nothing to do with the source of the favoritism. As repugnant as it is for impar-
tiality to be precluded by one's own political beliefs, it seems all the worse when the source of the 
bias is the political beliefs of one's attorney-or the attorney of one's opponent. 
106. Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 402-03. One respondent to this nationwide survey of 
state court judges stated, "I very much appreciated the contributions I received from others. 
However, it makes me feel uncomfortable dealing with them in court." Id. at 402. 
This same judge continued, "Perhaps it would be better if we didn't know where the contri-
butions came from." Id. at 402-03. However, other judges disagreed, mostly on the ground that 
a judge must be able to recuse himself in a case involving a contributor. Id. at 403. 
107. Indeed, the direction in which the judge's sympathies may be altered is by no means 
clear. One judge who responded to the Ethical Dilemma survey, supra note 17, wrote that when 
a political contributor comes before him, he makes a practice of telling the opposing counsel. "If 
he or his client requests, I will then disqualify myself. Usually they don't, perhaps thinking I'll 
bend over backwards to the other side, which perhaps sub-consciously [sic] I might." Id. at 403 
(emphasis added). 
108. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
109. 343 U.S. at 466-67. 
110. 343 U.S. at 467. 
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have seemed trivial to some, but to Justice Frankfurter his recusal fol-
lowed from a broader principle: 
The judicial process demands that a judge ... think dispassionately and 
submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case .... This is achieved 
through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate 
alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are 
entrusted. But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious 
influence of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for 
believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate 
judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, 
judges recuse themselves .... The guiding consideration is that the ad-
ministration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as 
well as be so in fact. 111 
Some may object that attempting to eliminate bias from the judi-
cial process altogether is taking things too far. 112 Indeed, on some 
views of the judicial process, bias is so inevitable that disqualification 
for any one ground of bias - such as political support - is pointless. 
Consider Jerome Frank: 
[U]niquely individual factors often are more important causes of judg-
ments than anything which could be described as political, economic, or 
moral biases. . . . 
... [T]hese more minute and distinctly personal biases are operating 
constantly. So the judge's sympathies and antipathies are likely to be 
active with respect to the persons of the witness, the attorneys and the 
parties to the suit .... A certain twang or cough or gesture ... may affect 
the judge's initial hearing of, or subsequent recollection of, what the wit-
ness said, or the weight or credibility which the judge will attach to the 
witness's testimony.113 
If Frank's view of the enterprise of adjudication is correct, then the 
111. 343 U.S. at 466-67 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter was speaking only of discre-
tionary recusal; the constitutional significance of mere "appearance of impropriety" unaccompa-
nied by a probability of actual bias is doubted in note 48 supra. However, since observers could 
hardly have known much about the intensity of Justice Frankfurter's opinion about the bus 
broadcasts (or even whether he rode the bus to Capitol Hill each morning), appearance probably 
played little part in his decision to recuse himself. 
112. Contrast with Justice Frankfurter's decision the following anecdote told by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in 1973: 
I was sitting with a group of people whom I didn't know very well at a dinner party in 
Washington ... during the time the Watergate hearings were being televised daily. Not long 
after we sat down, the subject turned, as it doubtless did at most other dinner parties in 
Washington that evening, to the subject of Watergate and what the various diners thought 
of the various witnesses. In the midst of the discussion, one of the speakers turned to me 
and said: "Wait a minute. We probably shouldn't be talking about this in front of you, 
because it will probably come to the Supreme Court eventually." 
I thanked him for his consideration, but added that iflistening to this discussion were to 
render me damaged goods for the purpose of adjudication, it was at most harmless error in 
view of the damage I had already sustained by being exposed to the daily newspapers and 
television news programs. 
Rehnquist, supra note 38, at 711. 
113. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 106 (1930) (footnote omitted). 
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thesis of this Note might be thought to be ridiculously underinclusive. 
Is there a response? 
Certainly, one response would be to dispute Frank's characteriza-
tion of the enterprise of adjudication, but a critique of Legal Realism is 
beyond the scope of this Note. However, even if Frank is correct in 
asserting that judicial bias is inevitable, there is a special case for elimi-
nating bias from political sources. "A certain twang or cough or ges-
ture" may, unfortunately, affect a judge's decision in any particular 
case; and if that is inevitable, then more is the pity. But no state cur-
rently selects its judges on the basis of twangs, coughs, gestures, or a 
judicial candidate's reactions thereto. Forty-three states do select 
judges on the basis of their ability to develop political connections and 
attract political support. Given that the state's authority will be re-
posed in some judges precisely because of their political views and affil-
iations, the state has a special duty to neutralize the improper effects of 
its own selection process, even if it cannot hope to control for all possi-
ble sources of bias. 
Of course, the question of whether the possible temptation 
presented by large contributions rises to constitutional magnitude is 
ultimately a factual question about human nature itself. Can cam-
paign contributions which fall short of bribery really cause any judge 
to show favoritism to a party? Some statistics indicate that at the very 
least, many contributors think so. 114 In Cook County, for instance, 
unopposed candidates raised substantial sums of money over and 
above their modest needs, 115 and data on attorney contributions in 
particular show that "the tendency to give heavily to sitting judges 
was more pronounced for attorney contributors" than it was for 
nonattorney contributors. 116 These researchers concluded that "the 
data suggests [sic] that a great many contributions are given for rea-
114. It may seem odd to argue for the utility of a "temptation" standard, which focuses on 
the mental state of the judge, by pointing to the motivations of some contributors. However, it 
would be difficult to explain the persistence of the belief among many contributors that the cost 
of contributing is justified by the favor it buys unless the lawyers confessing such motivations had 
some reason to believe that their contributions did in fact work to their clients' advantage in 
court. 
115. See Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 6, at 20. 
116. Id. at 22. Nicholson and Weiss note that the "strong attorney preference for sitting 
judges [is] independent of whether the candidate is expected to win or lose." They explain, 
Because of the size of the Cook County court system, contributors cannot know whether 
they will ever practice before successful partisan candidates. Therefore, the possibility of 
obtaining influence may be remote when contributions are given to expected winners. On 
the other hand, attorneys may have to deal on a day-to-day basis with sitting judge candi-
dates .... Although there may be legitimate reasons why attorneys contribute so heavily to 
sitting judge candidates, even when they know they will lose, it is difficult to dispel the 
impression that some of these contributions are given for improper motives. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Predictions of a candidate's success are unusually reliable in Cook 
County, due to its highly partisan style of politics and its heavily Democratic demography. Id. at 
18. 
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sons other than to assure the victory of qualified candidates."117 
These trends certainly do not prove that judges or attorneys are cor-
rupt, 118 and they do not necessarily prove that attorneys are "getting 
their money's worth." However, the inadequacy of any apparent legit-
imate explanation suggests a substantial possibility of constitutional 
violations. 119 
C. Assessing a Contribution's Legitimacy 
Not all campaign contributions create constitutional difficulties. 
Courts should determine whether a recipient-judge's participation 
raises constitutional questions by evaluating the amount of the contri-
bution in question, the timing of the contribution, and the pattern of 
support, if any, existing between the contributor and the judge. 
The most obvious criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of a con-
tribution is the amount. 120 However, the amount should be evaluated 
with respect to the importance of the contribution to the judge rather 
than the importance of the judge to the contributor.121 If the judge 
117. Id. at 25. 
118. See note 8 supra. 
119. Whether or not the states or the legal profession are willing to indulge in the assumption 
that attorney contributions can actually bias a judge sworn to impartiality, there can be little 
doubt that the general public embraces such an assumption without reservation. For examples of 
this sentiment, see Baum, Query: Should Judges Know Who Gave to Their Campaigns?, 60 JUDI-
CATURE 258 (1977), in which the author quotes citizens of Detroit who assume that attorney 
contributions are attempts to "curry favor," create an obligation on the judge's part "to repay the 
favor," or engage in "a form of bribery." Id. at 258. 
As observed in notes 48 & 49 supra, the constitutional significance of the improper appear-
ance of some contributions is uncertain. However, there can be little doubt that some contribu-
tions do create such an improper appearance. Nicholson & Weiss wrote of their data, "Although 
there are plausible explanations other than that the contributors are seeking undue influence, an 
aura of impropriety is difficult to dispel." Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 6, at 25 (footnote omit-
ted). Another commentator has summed up the problem of attorney contributions to judicial 
campaigns by noting, "There may be some other questionable yet lawful and largely accepted 
practice that similarly undermines respect for judicial integrity and impartiality, but none comes 
to mind." Schotland, supra note 18, at 90. Whether or not the damage these contributions do to 
public respect for the judiciary is relevant to the constitutional inquiry, it certainly presents a 
compelling prudential reason for the states to adopt the reforms suggested in Part III infra. 
120. Or perhaps more aptly, the "substantiality" of the amount. Arguably, the constitu-
tional significance of a contribution should be measured with respect to the total cost of the 
judge's campaign, or perhaps the total of his contributions. One problem with the latter, how-
ever, is that the better a judge is at parlaying his influence into contributions, the less significant 
each contribution will look, even if quite sizeable in absolute terms. 
While the cost of judicial campaigns varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, judicial 
election campaigns generally cost less than campaigns for other elective offices at the same level 
of government. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 60, 112. 
The focus on amount obviously fits very poorly when the question is the judge's impartiality 
with respect to one who has provided nonpecuniary support, see note 8 supra. The analogous 
concept in the realm of nonpecuniary support might be called "intimacy," and courts might 
evaluate it by examining how closely the supporter worked with the judge, or how instrumental 
the support was in bringing about the judge's subsequent election. Whether the question is 
framed in terms of"amount," "substantiality," "intimacy," or something else, the ultimate ques-
tion is the extent to which a judge may feel grateful or indebted to a particular supporter. 
121. But see Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of The Association of the Bar of 
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does not rule in the contributor's favor, what will be the deleterious 
consequences for the judge's chance of reelection? To what extent is 
the judge likely to feel that he owes a favor to the contributor? To 
what extent would the judge simply like to see the contributor win, 
regardless of any personal gain? If the amount of the contribution is 
high enough that the judge's self-interest, gratitude, or personal sym-
pathy clearly operate in favor of his supporter, the probability of un-
fairness in court is very high.122 
Courts should also look at the timing of the contribution. A sub-
stantial contribution made five or six years before the judge must stand 
for reelection looks more suspicious (and may be more conspicuous to 
the judge) than a contribution of the same amount made two or three 
months before the election. 123 But a proper inquiry into the timing of 
the contribution must also take account of the political and legal con-
texts in which the contribution is given. Even fairly large contribu-
tions might seem legitimate if given two months before the election to 
help out a candidate in a tight race, or within a few months after the 
election to help retire a heavy campaign debt. The picture changes, 
however, if the recipient looks like a landslide winner two months 
before the election, 124 or if there is no campaign debt. Likewise, the 
pendency oflitigation may arouse suspicion. 125 Joseph D. Jamail, lead 
counsel for Pennzoil in its recent suit with Texaco over the acquisition 
of Getty Oil, 126 made two contributions of $10,000 each two days after 
filing the answer in that case. The first was to the pre-trial judge, and 
the second was to the judge who assigned trial judges. 127 This of 
course is not conclusive evidence of impropriety, but courts must take 
The City of New York, Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Campaigns, Opinion No. 882, 28 REC. 
A.B. CITY N.Y. 364, 365-66 (1973) [hereinafter Ethical Guidelines] (taking the counter-intuitive 
position that the important ethical consideration is whether the contribution is out of proportion 
to the contributor's ability to pay). 
122. The degree of temptation which might serve as the constitutional threshold is open to 
dispute. However, most states have laws forbidding the use of campaign funds for personal 
expenses, and in these states at least the threshold amount could be safely set above the amount 
which would trigger due process concerns in states that allow candidates to use campaign funds 
for expenditures other than campaigning. Cf Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), in which the 
"mayor's court" system that the Supreme Court invalidated added about $700 to the Mayor's 
annual income. 273 U.S. at 522. 
123. Cf CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972), which limits the solicitatio11 of 
campaign funds to a period of90 days (subject to modification by each state) before and after the 
election. The text of Canon 7(B) is set forth in note 11 supra. 
124. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 94: "In Pennsylvania's 1983 supreme court election, 
for example, the winning candidate received about 53% of his $193,575 campaign funds from 
lawyers; but over $75,000 of that was raised after he had won both parties' nominations in the 
primaries, and of that sum, 75% came from lawyers." 
125. See Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121, at 365. 
126. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Dec. 10, 1985). 
127. Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court 
Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 768 n.10 (1986). "[The pre-trial 
judge] was running unopposed in the primary, and the sum was large by local standards." Id. 
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note of timing considerations such as these if they are to reach an 
accurate conclusion about contributions which are in other respects 
questionable. 
Finally, courts should consider' any pattern of past contributions. 
For instance, a well-established pattern of support would generally in-
dicate the sort of "course of dealing" between judge and attorney that 
raises the probability of bias in court. 128 However, such patterns may 
support conflicting inferences, and a pattern of support might actually 
mitigate an otherwise suspicious transaction. If Smith's first contribu-
tion to Judge Jones occurs two days after Smith files a pleading in , 
litigation before Judge Jones, the transaction appears suspicious and 
due process concerns arise. However, if Smith has been contributing 
to Judge Jones for the last fifteen years, during which time he has 
never appeared before Judge Jones, the situation intuitively seems less 
improper. And the "course of dealing" rationale confirms this intui-
tion: By all indications, the course of dealing between Smith and 
Jones is such that Smith will continue to contribute no matter what. 
Hence Judge Jones has less reason to worry about satisfying Smith, 
and the opposing party has less reason to worry about Judge Jones. 
None of these factors should be taken in isolation to produce a 
result either way. 129 However, by evaluating exceptional contribu-
tions with respect to all of these factors, courts can draw inferences 
about the relationship between judge and litigant. Extremely large 
contributions will often constitute "possible temptation" to depart 
from neutrality whether or not any of the other circumstances sur-
rounding the contribution look suspicious. However, when a judge 
accepts contributions of even moderate amounts for which there are 
Texaco sought recusal, but that motion was denied. Id. (citing the transcripts of the unpublished 
decision cited in note 126 supra). 
When Texaco filed a complaint in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforce-
ment of this judgment, it renewed these allegations of judicial impropriety, but Judge Brieant 
apparently regarded the fact that the contributions were so openly given as evidence that they 
were legitimate. He confined his rather glib rejection of Texaco's allegations to a single footnote, 
writing, 
That some judicial goodwill eventuated to the contributing lawyer we may assume. Good-
will means perhaps his brief will be accepted a day late, a golfing continuance may be 
granted, and his jokes may evoke more judicial laughter than they otherwise deserve. But it 
is impossible for a lawyer to rub his own goodwill off onto the client, or the merits of his 
client's cause. 
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd. in part and revd. in part, 
784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). As an example of the subtle art of writing with a wink, this 
disposition of the issue is superb. As a rational argument why Texaco should be forced to litigate 
under such circumstances, Judge Brieant's response is far less satisfactory. See also Petzinger & 
Solomon, Texaco Case Spotlights Questions on Integrity of the Courts in Texas, Wall St. J., Nov. 
4, 1987, at l, col. 6 (Midwest ed.). 
128. See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text. 
129. Of course, the amount is probably the most important factor, with the others working in 
mitigation or aggravation. For instance, it is highly unlikely that due process concerns arise over 
a five-dollar contribution, no matter what the other circumstances are (unless of course the judge 
is insulted by the contributor's "generosity"). 
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no plausible legitimate explanations, the danger that a litigant will be 
denied his due process right to an impartial forum may be increased. 
Part III addresses the question of what courts should do in such 
circumstances. 
III. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
The argument thus far has been almost syllogistically straightfor-
ward. The due process clause grants to each litigant the right to a 
judge who has neither a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary inter-
est" in the outcome, nor a "possible temptation . . . not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true." 130 Some campaign contributions are sig-
nificant enough to the judge that they preclude his impartiality. 131 
Therefore, the due process clause is violated when any litigant is 
forced to try his case before a judge who is likely to have been influ-
enced by a prior contribution from opposing counsel. 
But this "conclusion" is really only the beginning of a more daunt-
ing inquiry: What is to be done to protect the due process rights that 
are currently being violated? This question is by its nature more spec-
ulative, and the conclusions must accordingly be more tentative. This 
Part first examines the remedy usually employed to redress due pro-
cess violations, 132 but then moves on to consider whether problems 
associated with the usual remedy make prevention the best 
medicine. 133 
A. The Pound of Cure: Recusal 
A litigant who is denied due process under the standards discussed 
in Part II will in most cases be entitled to a new trial with a new 
judge.134 Whenever the constitutional deficiency in the first trial is an 
130. The derivation of these two standards from Supreme Court decisions is the subject of 
Part I.B.2 supra. 
131. This proposition is defended in Part II supra. 
132. See text accompanying notes 134-61 infra. 
133. See text accompanying notes 162-98 infra. 
134. Occasionally in the realm of nonconstitutional disqualification resulting from relation-
ships between a judge and an attorney, the attorney is disqualified rather than the judge. See, e.g., 
Young v. Champion, 142 Ga. App. 687, 236 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (disqualifying city 
commissioner from practicing before the recorder's court because city commission was responsi-
ble for selecting the judge of the recorder's court). However, the effects of such disqualifications 
on both lawyers and clients, perhaps tolerable in the isolated case, make a blanket rule of attor-
ney disqualification undesirable. First, such a rule would "deprive[] the resulting unrepresented 
client of a free choice of counsel and [would] almost inevitably entail additional expense and 
delay." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 7.1.3, at 318. This deprivation could be all the more 
severe if it had been sought in order "to gain strategic advantage in litigation by depriving an 
opponent of the services of an advocate known by experience to be particularly effective." Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
Second, a policy of attorney disqualification would force the attorney to strike a balance 
between the unfettered exercise of his first amendment freedoms of political participation, see 
Part III.B infra, and the unfettered practice of his profession. Part III.B.2 argues that states may 
November 1987) Note - Judicial Campaign Contributions 407 
aberration involving only one particular judge or one particular liti-
gant, 135 such a disposition of the case will satisfy the requirement of an 
impartial forum. 136 Sometimes, however, the adjudicatory system in 
question is constructed so that the disqualifying factor is a necessary 
concomitant of any trial; 137 in these cases an order remanding the case 
"for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion"138 is tan-
tamount to the invalidation of the entire system.139 
Conceptually, a due process claim based on an extraordinary cam-
paign contribution would seem to be of the aberrational variety. By 
hypothesis, the due process concerns arise only because of some spe-
cial relationship between the judge and counsel for one of the parties. 
There will undoubtedly be a great many cases in which no such rela-
tionship is present, and which therefore pose no due process problem 
at all. Only if the threat to impartiality were systemic would invalida-
tion of the system be appropriate, and there is no reason to think that 
this is .true of state judicial elections: some judges decline contribu-
tions, and judicial elections could conceivably be run without attorney 
contributions at all.140 
However, state judicial elections aren't in fact run without attorney 
not prohibit independent expenditures on behalf of judicial candidates, and if that conclusion is 
sound then it ought to follow that the state may not force lawyers to engage in self-censorship. 
As for state restrictions on political contributions, Part III.B.1 argues that these are constitu-
tional. If that conclusion is sound, then perhaps states could pursue a policy of attorney disquali-
fication for contributions only. However, such a policy would be no more effective than direct 
regulation, and would have the distinct disadvantage of infringing client freedom of choice of 
counsel. 
135. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) Gudge was plaintiff in a 
similar suit pending in lower court); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (contempt 
for insults to judge); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (contempt); In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. 257 (1948) (contempt proceedings before judge-grand jury); Cooke v. United States, 267 
U.S. 517 (1925) (contempt, but not in open court). Cf Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197-98 
(1974) (White, J., concurring) (federal employee's pretermination hearing conducted by supervi-
sor accused of slandering the employee). 
136. Hence, Aetna's right to an impartial forum was fully secured by remanding the case to 
the Alabama Supreme Court, sitting without Justice Embry. 
137. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (state licensing procedure for optome-
trists); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) ("mayor's court"); In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133 (1955) (one-man grand jury); Washington ex rel Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 
U.S. 116 (1928) (veto over zoning ordinances given to neighbors, who owe no duty to be reason-
able or to consider any interests but their own); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ("mayor's 
court"); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (zoning decisions made by residents 
of block, who owe no duty to be reasonable or to consider any interests but their own). 
138. See, e.g., Ward, 409 U.S. at 62. 
139. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). The facts of Ward illustrate perfectly 
the phenomenon described in the text. Remanding Clarence Ward's case to the "mayor's court" 
in Monroeville, Ohio would not have remedied the due process violation (even if Monroeville had 
elected a new mayor by the time of remand) because any fine imposed on any offender by anyone 
exercising the powers that the Monroeville charter granted to the mayor would be subject to the 
objection that the judge imposing the fine had been biased toward a verdict of guilty by his 
concurrent role as mayor. 
140. But see notes 95-98 supra and accompanying text. 
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contributions. On the contrary, attorneys are the largest single group 
of contributors. 141 Therefore, even if the proper remedy is simply a 
different judge in each individual case rather than a judicial invalida-
tion of the entire system, recusal might not be a realistic solution to 
the problem. If instances of extraordinary campaign contributions are 
too frequent, there will be a dearth of uninfluenced judges. 142 
Empirical conclusions about the frequency of extraordinary cam-
paign contributions are hard to come by. However, some data suggest 
that, at least in some jurisdictions, due process violations are frequent 
indeed. Schotland's research reveals that in the 1981-1983 races for 
the Pennsylvania appellate courts, sixty-six attorneys contributed 
amounts of $500 or greater, with seventeen contributing more than 
$2,000 and six contributing more than $5,000. 143 Furthermore, the 
statements of some local attorneys indicate that many of these contrib-
utors were motivated by something other than an unusually high re-
gard for the candidates in question. A recent series of articles in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer quotes one western Pennsylvania lawyer as say-
ing that he, "like any other lawyer in town," believed that refusing to 
contribute to a judge's campaign would jeopardize the interests of his 
firm and its clients in that judge's courtroom. 144 Another lawyer 
stated that a $1,000 donation for Supreme Court justices was all but 
required, 145 and many law firms apparently "cover" themselves either 
by supporting both candidates or by sending a check to the winner 
after the election. 146 Recusal in every case argued by one of these at-
torneys or their firms might well be impracticable at the appellate 
level.147 
141. Schotland, supra note 18, at 118. 
142. See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), in which the Texas Court of 
Appeals rejected a motion to disqualify two of its justices on the allegation that opposing counsel 
had contributed "many thousands of dollars" to the justices in the past. 662 S.W.2d at 77. The 
court seemed to recoil at the logical implications of the argument, asserting, 
If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges 
who have been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed 
in their courts. Perhaps the next step would be to require a judge to recuse himself in any 
case in which one of the lawyers had refused to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to 
that judge's opponent. 
662 S.W.2d at 78 (emphasis added). No constitutional claim was made in Rocha. 
143. Schotland, supra note 18, at 149. 
144. Biddle, Fear Contributes to Lawyer Do11atio11s, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1983, at 
21-A, col. 1. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the situation might be more desperate still 
with respect to small towns with only one or two trial judges and few lawyers, or specialized 
courts like probate courts which customarily appoint executors and the like from a fairly exclu-
sive list of attorneys. Cf. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 7.1.3, at 318. Unfortunately, these spe-
cialized courts may present the most danger of improper political influence. A Colorado 
attorney has written, "Many [practicing lawyers] will recall telephone calls from court clerks in 
which they are told the exact dollar amounts of fees they have received through court appoint-
ments since the last election and what percentage of this amount they are expected to contribute 
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The administrative burden which constitutionally mandated 
recusal would force upon the states is thus a heavy one. In light of this 
fact, it might be argued that the "Rule of Necessity" ends the recusal 
question here. According to that ancient common-law doctrine, a 
judge, even though disqualified from hearing a particular case, may 
nonetheless hear the case if no determination could otherwise be 
had. 148 Thus, the argument would run, the very impracticability of 
disqualifying judges in so many individual cases on the basis of past 
political support from one of the attorneys dictates, under the Rule of 
Necessity, that no judge be disqualified on that basis. 
However, any such argument should be rejected. The Rule of Ne-
cessity "can be justified only by strict and imperious necessity."149 
Thus, in United States v. Will, 150 the Supreme Court was forced to 
hear a case involving the compensation clause of article III151 even 
though the federal disqualification statute152 seemed to disqualify all 
the justices from hearing such a case. The basis for the decision was 
that all article III judges would have been similarly disqualified; even 
the Chief Justice's statutory authorization to remit direct appeals153 to 
the court of appeals whenever disqualification precludes a quorum, 154 
combined with his statutory power to reassign other federal judges to 
sit temporarily, 155 could not have produced a competent tribunal. 156 
It was thus a case of absolute necessity, where even the normal proce-
dures for substitution were inadequate and a constitutional right was 
in need of determination.151 
in the campaign." Anderson, Ethical Problems of Lawyers and Judges in Election Campaigns, 50 
A.B.A. J. 819, 821 (1964). 
148. See generally Annotation, Necessity as Justifying Action by Judicial or Administrative 
Officer Othenvise Disqualified to Act in Particular Case, 39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925). On the origins of 
the Rule of Necessity, see note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
149. Annotation, supra note 148, at 1479. 
150. 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
151. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the compensation of a federal judge shall not 
be diminished while in office). 
152. 28 u.s.c. § 455 (1982). 
153. The Will case was appealed to the Supreme Court directly from the district court under 
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), which permits direct appeal from any district court decision invalidat-
ing an act of Congress. Will, 449 U.S. at 210-11. 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1982). Had the case not been on direct appeal, see note 153 supra, 
§ 2109 would have directed the Court to affirm the decision of the court of appeals. However, 
§ 2109 guarantees the right to at least one appeal in cases invalidating acts of Congress. 
155. 28 u.s.c. §§ 291-96 (1982). 
156. Will, 449 U.S. at 212-13. 
157. See also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (involving a federal district judge's chal-
lenge to the income tax as a violation of the compensation clause): 
Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, ... we 
cannot but regret that its solution falls to us .... But jurisdiction of the present case cannot 
be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the 
question as respects his own compensation, ... and there was no other appellate tribunal to 
which under the law he could go. 
253 U.S. at 247-48. 
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Contrast with these cases of absolute necessity the far less desper-
ate (though admittedly serious) problem of political disqualification. 
It would be surprising indeed if anyone were so liberal with his contri-
butions that all judges were disqualified from hearing him argue a 
case. Even in small jurisdictions, or on appellate courts, where a situa-
tion of absolute necessity might most plausibly arise, states could pro-
vide for substitution of judges158 or even for the creation of special 
tribunals159 to mitigate the problem or even eliminate it entirely. 160 In 
short, the serious administrative burden which constitutionally man-
dated recusal would place on the states makes recusal unattractive as a 
matter of state administration of justice; but the problem of how to 
vindicate the constitutional rights161 of litigants remains one of con-
venience, not necessity. The Rule of Necessity thus cannot absolve 
states of their constitutional duty to provide each and every litigant 
with an impartial forum. Each of the forty-three states that elect their 
judges is faced with a choice between leaving many of its judgments 
vulnerable to attack on due process grounds or taking more effective 
measures to protect litigants' rights. Part 111.B examines the feasibil-
ity and efficacy of using campaign finance regulations to preserve the 
impartiality of state tribunals. 
B. The Ounce of Prevention: Regulating Campaign Contributions 
A due process violation of the type discussed in this Note stems 
not from the fact that a judge is elected, but from the fact that his 
contributors have impermissibly biased him in the decision of a partic-
ular case. Thus, rather than requiring recusal of a great many judges, 
a state may prefer to attack the problem by limiting campaign 
contributions. 
158. See, e.g., Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 165; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1-13, 11-1-15 (1972). 
159. See, e.g., Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Special Supreme Court of Texas 1925), which 
involved an appeal by a fraternal organization to which all the justices of the Texas Supreme 
Court belonged. The Governor of Texas used his statutory authority to appoint a Special 
Supreme Court, composed of three women, to hear the case. 272 S.W. at 1098. Some Governors 
still possess similar authority. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-102 (1980). 
160. It is difficult to imagine how absolute necessity could ever arise in a jurisdiction in which 
some state official wielded the power of temporary appointment mentioned in note 159 supra. 
161. Note that the constitutional rights present in the compensation clause cases and in the 
impartial forum cases are crucially different. In Will and Evans, the constitutional right at issue 
was the subject matter of the suit in which the disqualification problem arose. Strict application 
of constitutional disqualification doctrine, unameliorated by the Rule of Necessity, would have 
led to the intolerable result that the claimed constitutional right could not have been vindicated 
in any court of the United States. In such a case, it could well be said that imperfect justice was 
better than no justice at all. 
In contrast, the due process right to an impartial forum may arise in any substantive context. 
The underlying dispute may be a claim in tort or contract, which presents a far less compelling 
case for "resolution at any cost." The constitutional right involved is concerned precisely with 
the way in which the state resolves the underlying claim. In such a situation, the Rule of Neces-
sity, far from providing the only means of vindicating an important constitutional right, is actu-
ally an excuse for ignoring the right altogether. 
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However, this course of conduct raises first amendment concerns 
similar to those which the Supreme Court faced in Buckley v. Valeo. 162 
In Buckley, various federal officeholders, candidates, political organi-
zations, and potential contributors brought suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA) of 1971.163 The plaintiffs argued that the Act's 
limitations on both contributions and expenditures violated the first 
amendment by abridging the freedoms of both expression and associa-
tion. The Court agreed that both contributions and expenditures con-
stituted speech rather than conduct.164 
However, the Court perceived that limitations on independent ex-
penditures would produce consequences for political debate which 
were very different from those produced by limitations on contribu-
tions, and it distinguished between these two kinds of speech on that 
basis. 165 Because it concluded that the Act's "expenditure ceilings im-
pose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of 
political expression and association than do its limitations on financial 
contributions,"166 the Court upheld the $1,000 limitation on contribu-
tions by any individual to any one candidate, 167 and struck down the 
$1,000 limitation on independent expenditures by any individual "rel-
ative to a clearly identified candidate."168 
While Buckley clarified first amendment limitations on congres-
sional power to restrict contributions and expenditures in nonjudi-
cial169 campaigns, it is not fully dispositive of the question of state 
power to impose similar restrictions on contributions and expenditures 
in judicial campaigns. However, the principles the Buckley Court 
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
163. 424 U.S. at 8-9. 
164. 424 U.S. at 16. This conclusion seems to have been closely related to the Court's obser-
vation that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires ex-
penditure of money." 424 U.S. at 19. But see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money 
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1011-12 (1976). Judge Wright disagrees with the Court's passive 
acceptance of the "mass society's definitions of effectiveness" and argues that "face-to-face com-
munication is more effective in a sense highly relevant to the First Amendment: it promotes real 
interchange among citizens concerning the issues and candidates about which they must make a 
choice." Id. Judge Wright also sharply criticizes Buckley's central premise that money is 
speech. 
165. 424 U.S. at 19-23. The Court opined that an expenditure limitation "necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of 
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted). By 
contrast, "a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candi-
date or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to 
engage in free communication." 424 U.S. at 20-21. 
166. 424 U.S. at 23. 
167. 424 U.S. at 24-29. 
168. 424 U.S. at 39-51. 
169. Buckley cannot provide direct authority as to judicial campaigns because the elections 
regulated by the FECA were exclusively federal, which of course means nonjudicial. 
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used to analyze each type of campaign regulation provide a framework 
for scrutinizing such legislation under the first amendment. 
1. Campaign Contributions 
Because the "transformation of contributions into political debate 
involves speech by someone other than the contributor,"170 the Buck-
ley Court believed that limitations on contributions implicated primar-
ily the freedom of association rather than the freedom of speech. 171 
The Court interpreted several of its rulings to stand for the proposition 
that governmental interference with the freedom of association could 
be sustained "if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest 
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of 
associational freedoms." 172 
Using this formula, the Court proceeded to weigh the congres-
sional interests advanced in support of the PECA against the magni-
tude of the interference with first amendment rights. Having already 
characterized the contributions ceilings as "marginal restriction[s]" 173 
which "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political 
association,"174 the Court found it "unnecessary to look beyond the 
Act's primary purpose [of combatting the actuality and appearance of 
corruption] in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for 
the $1,000 contribution limitation."175 The Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim that bribery laws and disclosure requirements constituted 
less restrictive means of furthering this anticorruption purpose, 176 and 
concluded that the contribution limitations passed muster under this 
"rigorous standard of review." 111 
Nothing in Buckley indicates that the Court relied on any congres-
sional justifications not available to the states. 178 Indeed, the state 
courts that have considered the constitutionality of state campaign 
regulation since Buckley was decided have been unanimous in apply-
ing to their own statutes the same standards that the United States 
170. 424 U.S. at 21. 
171. 424 U.S. at 24-25. 
172. 424 U.S. at 25. 
173. 424 U.S. at 20. 
174. 424 U.S. at 22. 
175. 424 U.S. at 26. The government also claimed that the FECA equalized citizens' com-
parative abilities to affect election outcomes, and acted as a brake on skyrocketing campaign 
costs. 424 U.S. at 26. 
176. 424 U.S. at 27-28. 
177. 424 U.S. at 29. For an attack upon the Court's extraordinary deference in this part of 
the opinion, so uncharacteristic in the first amendment area, see Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: 
The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. 
REV. 323, 346-48. 
178. On the contrary, the formulation of the balancing test employed by the Court was ac-
companied by citations to several cases challenging state action. See 424 U.S. at 25. 
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Supreme Court applied in Buckley. 179 However, neither the United 
States Supreme Court nor the state courts that have considered contri- · 
bution ceilings have defined the constitutional minima in the area of 
contribution restrictions. 180 This is somewhat troublesome in the con-
text of judicial elections, since they differ sufficiently from legislative 
elections that due process concerns may be thought to arise from con-
tributions of considerably less than $1,000. 181 
However, these same differences between judicial and nonjudicial 
elections increase the weight of the st~te's interest in campaign regula-
tion, and justify special rules for judicial elections. First, judicial elec-
tions differ from legislative elections in that judges often run 
unopposed, or with the endorsement of both major parties. 182 The up-
shot is that many candidates need very little in the way of campaign 
funds - a phenomenon virtually unknown in United States Congres-
sional races. Combined with the lower comparative cost of judicial 
elections in general, the danger of any one contributor gaining undue 
influence is therefore much greater in judicial elections. More funda-
mentally, it is in some sense legitimate for one who contributes to a 
legislative campaign to expect the candidate to heed the contributor's 
views more than those of a noncontributor. 183 Judges, on the other 
hand, are expected to be impartial as between the parties. Any altera-
179. See, e.g., Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Hernandez Colon, 415 F. Supp. 475 (D.P.R. 
1976); Schiller Park Colonial Inn v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 1976); Advisory Opinion on Con-
stitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 242 N.W.2d 3 (Mich. 1976). 
180. See Nicholson, supra note 177 at 34 7 n.105. Some language in the opinion suggests that 
contributions may, consistently with the first amendment, be limited to considerably less than 
$1,000 since contributing is merely an "undifferentiated, symbolic act." 424 U.S. at 21. The 
Court also observed that the amount of any contribution can provide no more than "a very rough 
index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate" due in part to inequalities in 
financial ability to contribute. See 424 U.S. at 21 & n.22. 
However, the problem with interpreting Buckley to mean that symbolism is the primary value 
implicated by restrictions on contributions is that such an interpretation seems inconsistent with 
the Buckley Court's explicit rejection of the "symbolic speech" analysis announced in United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See 424 U.S. at 15-17. This is part of a larger coherence 
problem with the lengthy per curiam opinion in Buckley, which has been criticized as having "a 
certain patchwork ... quality [that] seems to extend beyond style [to] an analytical inconsistency 
[in] the Court's discussion of many of the substantive issues." Nicholson, supra note 177 at 325. 
181. See note 183 infra. 
182. Schotland, supra note 18, at 83-84. 
183. Professor Schotland notes that contributions in nonjudicial campaigns usually dwarf 
those in judicial campaigns, and asks, 
What is it about those other races that attracts more dollars? To the extent that such races 
draw funds aimed at "buying access," one is quite willing to accept lesser funding for judi-
cial races; such contributions are clearly improper in judicial races. Can we safely assume 
that judicial campaign contributions are selfless support for friends, for courts as institu-
tions, or for judges especially worthy of retention? If we deem such an assumption realistic 
about only some of the contributions to judicial candidates (or perhaps the assumption 
reveals only that faith in tooth fairies is not limited to our children), aren't we implicitly 
condemning the other dollars contributed to these campaigns? That is, whatever may be the 
"right" level of funding for non-judicial races, almost any substantial funding in any judicial 
race seems presumptively a matter for deep concern. 
Schotland, supra note 18, at 112-13. 
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tion of that balance toward one side or the other is a departure from 
the fundamental ideal of Justice. To the extent that a state seeks to 
protect the constitutional rights of litigants in its own fora, its interest 
is accordingly more compelling than the anticorruption justification 
which supported the statute challenged in Buckley. As Justice Stewart 
has written, "There could hardly be a higher governmental interest 
than a State's interest in the quality ofitsjudiciary."184 Hence, a state 
should have even greater power to protect its judiciary from the taint 
of financial influence than it would have to police legislative races. 
In summary, a state's interest in preserving the integrity of its judi-
cial selection process is even stronger than the justifications for con-
gressional action approved in Buckley, and should justify limitations 
on contributions to state judicial campaigns even more restrictive than 
the congressionally imposed ceiling of $1,000 upheld in Buckley. 
However, the first amendment requirements surrounding the regula-
tion of independent expenditures are more difficult to satisfy. 
2. Independent Expenditures 
In stark contrast to the Supreme Court's characterization of con-
tribution as an "undifferentiated, symbolic act" 185 is its assertion that 
expenditure ceilings "limit political expression 'at the core of our elec-
toral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' " 186 Thus, while 
only associational freedoms were impinged upon by contribution re-
strictions, the expenditure limitations squarely raised the right to free-
dom of expression. Against this weightier first amendment right, the 
Court found none of the proffered governmental interests sufficient.187 
In order to avoid vagueness problems, the Court interpreted the 
statutory limitation on expenditures "relative to a clearly identifiable 
candidate" to encompass only those "expenditures for communica-
tions that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office.'' 188 Having done so, the Court 
unsurprisingly found it to be insufficiently related to the problem of 
corruption, since the narrow construction made it easy to circumvent 
the statute.189 The Court also noted that independent expenditures do 
184. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
186. 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). This difference in 
the way the Court characterized the two rights at stake reflects its earlier conclusion that a 
limitation on expenditures constituted a direct restraint which "necessarily reduces the quantity 
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the 
size of the audience reached." 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted). 
187. 424 U.S. at 51. 
188. 424 U.S. at 41-44 (footnote omitted). 
189. For instance, an advertisement could promote the candidate and his views without ex· 
pressly advocating his election or his opponent's defeat. See 424 U.S. at 45. 
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not present the same degree of danger of corruption as large campaign 
contributions. 19° Finally, the Court rejected the government's "ancil-
lary" interest in equalizing political influence, calling "the concept 
that government may restrict the speech of some elements in our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others ... wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment."191 
State and lower federal courts have followed Buckley to invalidate 
state restrictions on independent spending as uniformly as they have 
upheld contribution ceilings.192 Absent some special state interest of 
more gravity than those that the Court found insufficient in Buckley, it 
seems unlikely that a state could constitutionally regulate independent 
political expenditures. Fortunately, however, the due process rights of 
litigants can be protected without such limitations: if the states may 
constitutionally limit campaign contributions, then the only threat to 
the impartiality of state elective judges will be from independent ex-
penditures, and the incidence of such expenditures is surely slight. 193 
As a result, recusal will be a manageable solution to the problem of 
possible judicial bias.194 
Furthermore, there are three reasons why it seems implausible to 
expect that imposing a ceiling on contributions will result in any ap-
preciable rise in the independent expenditures attorneys undertake on 
behalf of judges. First, judges are sensitive to the appearance of im-
propriety, and many indicate that they take contributions from attor-
190. 424 U.S. at 47: 
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to 
the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prear-
rangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only 
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that 
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. 
Compare the Court's earlier statement that banning contributions would hav~ no adverse effect 
upon funding because it would merely "compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts 
greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression." 424 U.S. at 
22. 
191. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
192. See, e.g., Bang v. Chase, 442 F. Supp. 758 (D. Minn. 1977), ajfd. mem., 436 U.S. 941 
(1978); Hardie v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal Rptr. 201 (1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 969 (1977); Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. Fair Political Practices Commn., 16 Cal. 3d 
671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976); Labor's Educational and Political Club - Indep. 
v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1977). 
193. Indeed, the increasing significance of political action committees since Buckley might be 
seen as the logical response to the difficulty of making an effective independent political expendi-
ture on one's own. 
194. Regardless of the fecundity of any distinction between judicial and nonjudicial elections 
in assessing the relevant state interest in regulating expenditures, cf notes 147-50 supra and 
accompanying text, the viability of recusal (when used in conjunction with campaign contribu-
tion limitations) as a way to advance the state's interest in the administration of justice in its 
courts makes any attempt to avoid the Buckley prohibition on expenditure ceilings less likely to 
succeed, due to the "least restrictive means" aspect of the Court's analysis. See text accompany-
ing note 172 supra. 
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neys reluctantly. 195 An independent political expenditure of a 
magnitude sufficient to attract the judge's attention is likely to attract 
the attention of others as well, and the increased scrutiny and aura of 
impropriety may well be most unwelcome. 196 Second, anecdotal ac-
counts of why lawyers contribute indicate that they simply want to be 
"on record" as having made a show of support. 197 However, the cost 
of any meaningful independent expenditure may very well exceed 
what most lawyers are willing to pay to gratify this desire. 198 
But probably more important than either of these reasons is the 
self-fulfilling nature of a rule requiring judicial recusal whenever one 
of the attorneys has made an independent expenditure on behalf of the 
judge. If an attorney knows that the consequence of spending abnor-
mal amounts of money on a judicial candidate will be that candidate's 
disqualification from any case in which the attorney appears, then he 
will have little reason to believe that making the expenditure will bene-
fit him or his clients. The level of independent expenditures on behalf 
of judicial candidates can therefore be expected to continue to reflect 
honest enthusiasm for the candidate, rather than the illegitimate desire 
to avoid campaign restrictions. 
To be sure, prohibiting campaign contributions from lawyers raises 
other problems; and although they are problems of public policy 
rather than of constitutionality, they are nonetheless serious. One 
concern is that if the amount of funding supplied by lawyers is re-
stricted by statute, it is reasonable to expect that total contributions 
will decline, since lawyers account for so much of the total amount 
contributed. 199 This might lead to less discussion of the issues in judi-
cial campaigns;200 or worse, increase the importance of a candidate's 
personal wealth. 201 To offset this problem, states might try to institute 
195. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 18, at 160, 162; Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 397· 
403. 
196. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47, where the Court observed that independent, uncoordinated 
political expenditures may be counterproductive. It is important to remember in this connection 
that independent expenditures, unlike campaign contributions, are made in a way calculated to 
attract as much public attention as possible. 
197. See text accompanying notes 114-19, 144-46 supra. 
198. The Buckley Court was impressed by the finding in the record that "as of January I, 
1975, one full-page advertisement in a daily edition of a certain metropolitan newspaper cost 
$6,971.04." 424 U.S. at 20 n.20. This sum is by no means prohibitive, as all too many anecdotal 
accounts suggest. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 126-27 supra. It is important to remember, 
however, that campaign regulation need not prevent all political improprieties in order to protect 
the right to an impartial forum. To be successful, regulation need only reduce the frequency of 
improper support to the level at which recusal becomes a manageable solution. 
199. See notes 6 & 124 supra. 
200. Anyone familiar with the standard fare in judicial campaigns may certainly wonder how 
deleterious fewer repetitions of it would be. There are so many outrageous anecdotes, ranging 
from the merely irrelevant through the unseemly to the downright misleading, that it would be 
impossible to do them justice in this Note. For just a smattering, interested readers should con· 
suit Forum, The Robed Politician, L.A. LAW., Mar. 1979, at 12. 
201. See Ethical Dilemma, supra note 17, at 398-99. 
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a system of public funding by which qualified candidates would re-
ceive financial assistance in return for a promise not to accept contri-
butions from lawyers or their firms. 202 
A second problem with strict regulation of lawyer contributions J.s 
the possibility that the "funding gap" they leave might be filled by 
"[s]pecial interest groups [who] are less qualified than attorneys to as-
sess the professional competence of the candidates, and [who] may 
care less about competence."203 Two separate dangers arise here. The 
first is that lawyers and law firms might reconstitute themselves as 
political action committees (PACs) for the purpose of circumventing 
the statutory limitations on lawyer contributions or the constitutional 
rule of disqualification that would normally result from an independ-
ent expenditure by a lawyer. 204 With respect to contributions, compe-
tent draftsmanship should be able to solve the problem by limiting 
contributions from PA Cs that are dominated by lawyers in terms of 
administration, membership, or funding. As for independent expendi-
tures, courts could subject lawyer PA Cs to the same constitutional 
rule of disqualification that applies to the lawyers themselves.205 
A more serious danger is raised by ostensibly nonlawyer PACs that 
nonetheless have a real stake in the overall predisposition of the bench. 
A group of insurance companies, for instance, might engage in exten-
sive independent expenditures on behalf of judicial candidates who 
202. Some local bar associations have tried this approach on a voluntary basis. For instance, 
the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland adopted a plan in 1974 which requires any candidate 
seeking the Bar Association's endorsement to agree "not [to] solicit or accept funds, directly or 
indirectly, from or through any individual attorney or any member of his immediate family, or 
from or through any law firm practicing in Cuyahoga County, Ohio." Agreement of Candidate 
Seeking Bar's Endorsement, 45 CLEVELAND B.J. 157, 157 (1974). The candidate must also 
pledge not to allow any attorney to serve on his campaign committee, and to recuse himself in 
any case in which a member of his campaign committee is a party unless, after full disclosure of 
the relationship, the consent of all parties to the action has been obtained. Id. 
The Cleveland plan has generally worked very well; however, the Cleveland plan and similar 
plans in Dade County, Florida, and Wayne County, Michigan, have been beset by the fact that 
federal and state officials charged with enforcing the applicable tax and disclosure laws have been 
unwilling to treat the resulting judicial campaign funds any differently than they would treat 
funds dispersed by a typical political action committee. These difficulties eventually led to the 
death of the Dade County and Wayne County plans. See Schotland, supra note 18, at 96-107. 
State legislation providing for a publicly financed version of these programs would enjoy distinct 
advantages in this respect. 
203. Baum, supra note 119, at 258. 
204. See text accompanying notes 192-94 supra. 
205. Note that disqualification in this situation would not depend upon theories of alter ego 
or "controlling person" liability such as those familiar to corporations law or securities regula-
tion. Instead, it would be a straightforward application of the analysis developed in Part II.C. If 
a particular PAC's contribution to ajudge, and a particular attorney's influence within the PAC, 
were significant enough that a decision in favor of the party represented by the PAC attorney 
would substantially advance that judge's chance of reelection, or create a possible temptation for 
the judge to favor one litigant, then the attorney affiliated with the PAC should be disqualified. 
The question of how closely the attorney and the PAC are affiliated is relevant only to the extent 
that it bears on whether the judge's gratitude to or dependence on the PAC might manifest itself 
in bias toward the attorney. 
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have generally been more demanding of plaintiffs in personal injury 
cases. Or, the American Medical Association might support judges 
who are more exacting in malpractice cases.206 This danger is real, but 
it is not a danger of favoritism toward a particular litigant; instead it is 
a matter of the overall character of the bench. As such, it would seem 
to be one of the incidents of having an elective system at all rather 
than a malady peculiar to limitations on lawyer contributions. 
In summary, the best way for a state to protect its citizens from the 
due process violations occasioned by extraordinary judicial campaign 
contributions may be to prevent those contributions from becoming 
"extraordinary" in the first place. This it may do, consistently with the 
first amendment, by limiting contributions to judicial campaigns. It is 
probably constitutionally impermissible to regulate independent polit-
ical expenditures, but these expenditures are likely to be of such slight 
incidence that mandatory recusal in such cases is feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the constitutional right to an impartial 
forum should protect individuals from judicial bias that results from 
an attorney's campaign contributions. Whenever such contributions 
are large enough that a decision in the contributor's favor would sub-
stantially advance a judge's chance of reelection, or whenever such 
contributions otherwise create a possible temptation to decide one way 
or the other, this important constitutional right is violated. The ad-
versely affected litigant should be granted a new trial with a new 
judge. However, the magnitude of the problem may be so great that 
recusal alone will not suffice to cure the constitutional infirmity. 
States may need to regulate lawyer contributions more strictly in order 
to fully protect the individual's right to due process. 
In the end, it may be that the best way to preserve the impartiality 
of elected judges is not to elect them. The Constitution does not spec-
ify how judges are to be selected in the various states. It does, how-
ever, specify that individuals are not to be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. And impartiality is the very 
heart of due process. As one judge has stated, 
A legislator or executive may to some extent represent special interests 
to whom he owes his election. To be sure, he should not put those inter-
ests ahead of the general welfare, but no one expects him to be impartial. 
A judge, however, who is not impartial is nothing. Worse, he is an op-
pression; only because of her blindfold is the goddess of justice given a 
sword.207 
If the states are to demonstrate that they take the constitutional right 
206. These PACs would not themselves be litigants, and so could not be treated as "institu-
tional litigants" on the theory described in note 85 supra. 
207. Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10, 14 (1976). 
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to an impartial forum seriously, then they must reform their judicial 
selection processes to eliminate the political bias that now creeps into 
the system in the vast majority of states, and runs rampant in some. If 
this can be done within an elective system, then the state is perfectly 
free to choose that method. Whatever other arguments there are 
against such a system, nothing in the Constitution prohibits it per se. 
However, if an elective system can only be instituted at the expense 
of individual rights of due process, then the Supreme Court must be 
ready to take its own pronouncements about procedural fairness seri-
ously, and to strike down such systems. The primacy of the constitu-
tional rights of the individual in our constitutional scheme demands 
no less. 
- Mark Andrew Grannis 
